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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, the Arizona Superintendent of Public Instruction (now Attorney
General) Tom Horne received public complaints about Tucson Unified School
District’s (TUSD) Mexican American Studies (MAS) program. Upon
investigation, he learned that the MAS program promoted race-based resentment
bordering on hatred among public school students in Tucson, Arizona. He
discovered disturbing facts about the divisive, biased, and politically radical
courses and issued detailed findings (the “2010 Findings”) that showed why the
MAS program violated A.R.S. § 15-112, an Arizona statute that prohibits curricula
founded on race- and class-based resentment. (ER10 at 2183 – 92.)
The 2010 Findings found that the MAS teachers propounded “Critical Race
Theory” – which distinguished itself from traditional civil rights by rejecting
“incrementalism and step-by-step progress,” instead questioning “the very
foundation of the liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning,
Enlightenment rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law." (Id. at
2191.)
The 2010 Findings stated that the curricular materials for the MAS classes
included “A Field Guide for Achieving Equity in School.” (Id.) The Field Guide
stated that “privilege” refers to the amount of melanin in a person's skin, hair, and
eyes. (Id.) The Field Guide instructed the mostly minority students in the MAS
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courses that: “[w]hite people tend to dominate the conversation by setting the tone
for how everyone must talk and which words should be used” and that “[a]ll of
these ‘White ways’ must be recognized, internalized, and then silently acted on by
people of color.” (Id.) The text stated that “[a]nger, guilt, and shame are just a few
of the emotions experienced by participants as they move toward greater
understanding of Whiteness,” and explained that “White Americans often feel a
unique sense of entitlement to Americanism, partly because many never travel
beyond the borders of the United States.” (Id.)
The 2010 Findings described how the textbooks used by the MAS teachers
held up José Ángel Gutiérrez as a role model despite Gutiérrez’s call upon
Chicanos to “kill the gringo” to solve their existing problems. (Id. at 2189.) Other
teaching materials, addressing the subject of “Conquest and Colonization,”
informed students that “half of Mexico was ripped off by trickery and violence”
and that “Chicanos became a colonized people” who “[i]n the process of being
colonized, . . . were robbed of land and other resources.” (Id. at 2191.)
The 2010 Findings concluded that these texts clearly violated A.R.S. § 15112 by promoting resentment toward a race or class of people. (Id. at 2192.) They
noted that if one were to substitute any other race for “Whiteness,” it would be
obvious how these curricular materials promoted resentment toward a race or a
people. (Id. at 2191.)
2
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The 2010 Findings included an exchange between the former chairman of
the Ethnic Studies Department (and developer of the new multicultural curricula),
Augustine Romero, and a CNN reporter regarding the original name of the MAS
program – “La Raza.” (Id. at 2185.) Augustine Romero explained that he named
the MAS program “La Raza” after a political movement “so that our students could
recognize and connect to their indigenous side, just like the word ‘dine’ for the
Navajo translates to ‘the people,’ like the word ‘o’odham’ for the Tohono O'odham
translates to ‘the people.’ The word ‘yoeme’ for the Yoeme people translates to
‘the people.’ It was an attempt to connect to our indigenous sides, as well as our
Mexican side.” (Id.) The 2010 Findings concluded that “[i]f one of the purposes
of this course is ‘an attempt to connect with our indigenous sides, as well as our
Mexican side,’ then obviously the course is designed primarily for pupils of a
particular ethnic group.” (Id.)
The 2010 Finding incorporated numerous messages and complaints from
teachers and former teachers that indicated that this program chilled First
Amendment rights. (Id. at 2186 – 2188.) The 2010 Findings describe:
what an officially recognized resentment-based program does to
a high school. In a word, it creates fear. Teachers and counselors are
being called before their school principals and even the district school
board and accused of being racists. And with a cadre of selfacknowledged ‘progressive’ political activists in the ethnic-studies
department on the hunt, the race transgressors are multiplying. (Id. at
2186.)
3
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The 2010 Findings described how the TUSD administration intimidated a
Hispanic teacher with an Anglo name by removing him from his class and calling
him a “racist” after the teacher objected to what Ethnic Studies specialists did in
his history class. (Id.) The former history teacher stated that this tactic “is
fundamentally anti-intellectual because it immediately stops debate by threatening
to destroy the reputation of those who would provide counter arguments.” (Id. at
2187.) The 2010 Findings contain an excerpt written by that former history
teacher to Superintendent Horne that said:
Condition: TUSD uses tax payer funded programs to
indoctrinate students, based primarily on ethnic divisions, in the belief
that there is a war against Latino culture perpetrated by a white, racist,
capitalist system.
Cause: TUSD has hired a group of radical socialist activists
who promote an anti-capitalist and anti-Western Civilization ideology.
They use ethnic solidarity as their vehicle of delivery. A climate of
outright intimidation has stopped many from standing up to this group
for fear of being labeled racists. . . .
Effect: Impressionable youth in TUSD have literally been
reprogrammed to believe that there is a concerted effort on the part of
a white power structure to suppress them and relegate them to a
second-class existence. This fomented resentment further encourages
them to express their dissatisfaction through the iconoclastic behavior
we see—the contempt for all authority outside of their ethnic
community and their total lack of identification with a political
heritage of this country. (Id.)

4
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The 2010 Findings also contain an excerpt from a statement made to
Superintendent Horne by a second teacher who described that she heard a MAS
teacher tell his students that:
[T]he U of A is a racist organization because only 12% of
students are Latino and they do not support the Latin students there. I
heard him tell students that they need to go to college so they can gain
the power to take back the stolen land and give it back to Mexico. He
personally told me that he teaches his students that republicans hate
Latinos and he has the legislation to prove it. When I asked him about
Mexican American Republicans who are against illegal immigration,
he said this is an example of self-racism. (Id.)
A third teacher stated:
I have, during the last two years, been attacked repeatedly here
at Tucson High by members of the Ethnic Studies department because
I question the substance and veracity of their American History and
Social Justice Government classes. I have been called racist by fellow
Tucson High teachers, members of the Ethnic Studies department, and
students enrolled in the departments’ classes. These charges come
simply because I ask the department to provide the primary source
material for the perspective they preach. The teachers of these classes
not only refuse to stop the name-calling but openly encourage the
students' behavior. (Id. at 2188)
A fourth teacher reported that:
I have had Hispanic students tell me that this is NOT the United
States of America. . . it is “occupied Mexico”. . . I have made simple
comments as a substitute such as “please pick up the paper under your
desk” only to receive an immediate response of “You don't like
Mexicans?” My response was to repeat my request of picking up the
papers and calmly add that they must be REALLY confused . . .
because I am also of Mexican descent. (Id.)

5
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Fifth, a Mexican-born English teacher at a TUSD high school informed
Superintendent Horne that the director of Raza Studies accused him of being the
“white man’s agent,” that when this director was a teacher he taught a separatist
political agenda, and that his students said that La Raza studies taught them not to
“fall for the white man's traps.” (Id.)
In a subsequent hearing, an independent Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
confirmed that the MAS pedagogy used a “philosophy of ‘us against them’” to
“cause students to develop a sense of racial resentment toward the ‘white
oppressor’ or ‘dominant group.’” (ER6 at 1126.) At that hearing, TUSD’s own
board president expressed his concern about the way MAS classes “promote[d]
racial resentment, and advocate[d] ethnic solidarity instead of treating students as
individuals.” (Id. at 1131.) Another board member described the program as
“racial indoctrination.” (Id.) The ALJ concluded that the elementary curriculum
promoted “barrio pedagogy,” that the middle school curriculum promoted ethnic
solidarity among “black and brown people while the white people are excluded,”
and that the high school curriculum included materials that “posit[ed] that white,
English-speaking individuals are protected by civil rights statutes, but ethnic and
racial minorities are not.” (Id., at 1132, 1135 – 36, and 1139.) The ALJ thus
concluded the MAS Program violated A.R.S. § 15-112(2), (3) and (4). (Id. at
1148.)
6
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendants/appellees accept Plaintiffs/Appellants jurisdictional statement. 1
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Arizona law declares that “public school pupils should be taught to treat and
value each other as individuals and not be taught to resent or hate other races or
classes of people.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 15-111. In furtherance of that
policy, the State Legislature enacted A.R.S. § 15-112, which prohibits a school
district or charter school from including courses or classes in its program of
instruction if those courses or classes promote the overthrow of the United States
government or resentment toward a race or class of people, are designed primarily
for pupils of a particular ethnic group, or advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the
treatment of pupils as individuals. The Superintendent initiated an enforcement
action against TUSD, alleging that its MAS program violated this statute.
1

This case is likely moot. The federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction
over “a claim as to which no effective relief can be granted; such a claim is
considered moot because “it has lost its character as a present, live controversy.”
United States v. Geophysical Corp. of Alaska, 732 F.2d 693, 698 (9th Cir. 1984).
“No matter how vehemently the parties continue to dispute the lawfulness of the
conduct that precipitated the lawsuit, the case is moot if the dispute “is no longer
embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal rights.”
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 727 (2013). The MAS program is gone.
(ER6 at 1159.) The school district (which is not a party to this lawsuit) has not
indicated that it would reinstate the program. In order to maintain a live
controversy, the Arce Plaintiffs need to establish that any favorable ruling from
this Court is likely to alleviate the alleged harm to them. Maldonado v. Morales,
556 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009). They cannot.
7
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Plaintiffs, who are students who assert a desire to take classes in the challenged
program, allege that these statutes, and this enforcement action, violate their
constitutional rights. This appeal presents the following issues:
1. Did the district court correctly conclude a State’s statutes regarding the
State’s curricular standards implicate public school students’ right to receive
information under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
2. Are A.R.S. §§ 15-111 and 112(A)(2) overbroad in violation of the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment?
3. Does A.R.S. § 15-112, which does not contain any race-based classifications
or create any political obstruction for minorities, violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on its face?
4. Were A.R.S. §§ 15-111 and -112 enacted or enforced with discriminatory
intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
5. Do the Arce Plaintiffs have standing to challenge claims that A.R.S. §§ 15111 and -112 for vagueness?
6. Is A.R.S. § 15-112 unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

8
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ISSUE ON CROSS-APPEAL
7. Is A.R.S. § 15-112 (A)(3),which prohibits classes “primarily for” a
particular ethnic group, overbroad or vague?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 18, 2010, plaintiffs, ten teachers and the director of the MAS
Program, (the Arce Plaintiffs) filed suit against then-Superintendent of Public
Instruction Tom Horne, in his official capacity, and the members of the Arizona
State Board of Education (as nominal parties), in their official capacities
(collectively, the Superintendent). (ER12 at 2716 – 17, 2853.)2 Plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of A.R.S. §§ 15-111 and -112. (Id. at 2853.) In
April 2011, the Arce Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to add two students, Maya
Arce and Korina Lopez, with Sean Arce and Lorenzo Lopez, Jr., their natural
parents and next best friends. (ER12 at 2800 – 02.) Student Nicholas A.
Dominguez, and his mother Margarita Elena Dominguez then intervened. (ER 7 at
1347, 1444-66.) Nicholas has since graduated from high school, and thus
voluntarily dismissed his claim. (ECF 245.)
The Arce Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their First Amended
Complaint on June 2, 2011. (ER12 at 2724 – 76.) They then filed a Second
2

References to “ER” are to the Arce Plaintiffs’ Excerpts of Record and include the
volume and the page number. References to “ECF” are to the document number in
the district court’s filing system. References to “OB” are to the Arce Plaintiffs’
Opening Brief.
9
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Amended Complaint just two weeks later. (ER12 at 2677 – 2712.) They filed
their Third Amended Complaint which includes allegations that the
Superintendent’s actions violated their rights to equal protection, free speech,
freedom of association, and substantive due process, and that § 15-112 is void for
vagueness facially and as applied, one month later. (ER10 at 2150 – 2320.)
The Superintendent moved to dismiss the complaint. (ER10 at 2119 – 35.)
One month later, the Arce Plaintiffs brought a second motion for summary
judgment on their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and First Amendment
overbreadth claims. (ER9 at 2034 – 82.) On November 16, 2011, the Arce
Plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction, seeking to stop the Superintendent
from completing his enforcement action, which was ongoing at the time. (ER9 at
1844 – 2118, ER10 at 1884 – 1922.)
On January 10, 2012, the district court granted defendants’ motion to
dismiss the teachers and the program director for lack of standing. (ER1 at 34 –
50.) The district court also dismissed the Arce Plaintiffs’ freedom of association
claim, and denied their first motion for preliminary injunction. (Id.) The Arce
Plaintiffs have not appealed this order.3
3

Although the Arce Plaintiffs specifically state that they have not appealed this
order (OB at 4, n.2), they nonetheless include it in Volume I of their excerpts of
record, despite the Ninth Circuit’s clear statement that “the first volume of the
excerpts of record shall be limited to specific portions of the transcript containing .
. . the orders to be reviewed.” 9th Cir. R. 30-1.6(a).
10
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The Arce Plaintiffs filed a second motion for preliminary injunction, which
relied on the claims raised in the summary judgment motion as well as their equal
protection and substantive due process claims. (ER5 at 897 – 951.) The
Superintendent opposed both the second motion for summary judgment and the
second request for a preliminary injunction, and filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment. (ECF 150, 197.)
On March 8, 2013, the district court denied the Arce Plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment, except as to its claim that A.R.S. § 15-112 (A)(3) was facially
overbroad. (ER1 at 32.) It held that provision severable, and granted summary
judgment in favor of the Superintendent on all remaining claims. (Id.) It also
denied the Arce Plaintiffs’ Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction as moot.
(Id.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
TUSD started its MAS program in 1998. (ER9 at 1851.) MAS classes were
conducted at all grade levels—elementary, middle, and high school. In high
school, the MAS classes were offered at several schools throughout the District.
(ER10 at 2214.) At the high school level, there were MAS classes in American
Government/Social Justice Education Project, Latino Literature, American
History/Mexican American Perspectives, and art. (Id.at 2220 – 21.) Such classes
satisfied the “core” curriculum requirements for junior and senior students, and
11
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thus counted toward graduation. (ER4 at 643.) Two middle schools offered
electives in “Chicano Studies,” while itinerant teachers offered such classes once a
week to students at three elementary schools. (Id. at 642, 725.) Although many
district schools offered MAS classes over some thirteen years, TUSD never
approved the MAS curriculum or many of the books used in it. (Id. at 531, 728;
ER6 at 1120; ER7 at 1298 – 99.)
In 2010, the Arizona Legislature passed a statute declaring that “public
school pupils should be taught to treat and value each other as individuals and not
be taught to resent or hate other races or classes of people.” A.R.S. § 15-111. To
promote this policy of equal treatment for all races, this law prohibits a public
school from offering any courses or classes that
1. Promote the overthrow of the United States government.
2. Promote resentment toward a race or class of people.
3. Are designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic
group.
4. Advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of pupils
as individuals.
A.R.S. § 15-112(A).
Superintendent Horne became aware of the MAS program because
constituents made complaints about it. (ER10 at 2184.) In late 2010, then12
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Superintendent Horne found that TUSD’s MAS program violated this law. (ER10
at 2183 – 92.) The present Superintendent of Public Instruction, John Huppenthal,
took office on January 3, 2011. Aware of the complaints about MAS, as well as
Horne’s findings, Huppenthal began an investigation into TUSD’s MAS program
to determine whether it complied with A.R.S. § 15-112; he directed his staff to
conduct an “in depth investigation and review of the Program and its curriculum,
materials, content and teacher practices.” (ER6 at 1092.)
He began by commissioning Cambium Learning to perform a study of the
MAS program for the purpose of determining “(1) how or if the Tucson Unified
School District Mexican American Studies Department programs are designed to
improve student achievement; (2) if statistically valid measures indicated student
achievement occurred; and (3) whether the Mexican American Studies
Department’s curriculum [was] in compliance with A.R.S. § 15-112(A).” (ER10 at
2201.) After reviewing the completed audit,4 the Superintendent concluded that it
was insufficient, because it did not include a comprehensive review of written
curriculum, teachers’ lesson plans or units used in the curriculum, textbooks,
student assessments, or sample student work in conjunction with classroom
observations, all elements that even TUSD’s Deputy Superintendent agreed should
be included in a curriculum audit. (ER6 at 1120.). In addition, Cambium allowed
4

The Cambium audit is at ER10 at 2197 – 2320.
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one of the creators of MAS to control the structure of the audit, as well as which
classes the auditors visited and when. (Id. at 1286.) Finally, the Cambium
auditors reviewed fewer than twenty percent of the written curriculum units 5 and
watched very few classes of instruction. (ER6 at 1122 – 23; ER10 at 2230.)
Because of his concerns about the Cambium audit’s insufficiency,
Superintendent Huppenthal directed high-ranking Department staff to conduct their
own investigation. (ER6 at 1258 – 59.) Based on his staff’s investigation as well
as his review of the Cambium audit, on June 15, 2011, Superintendent Huppenthal
issued findings concluding that TUSD’s MAS classes violated A.R.S. § 15-112.
(ER6 at 1092 – 94.) Huppenthal also noted TUSD’s failure to comply with A.R.S.
§ 15-341, which requires school boards to exclude from the curriculum “all books,
publications, papers or audiovisual material of a sectarian, partisan or
denominational character,” as well as with A.R.S. §§ 15-721 and 15-722, which
require school boards to approve the course of study and basic textbook (or
supplemental books) for each course. (Id.) The Superintendent then gave TUSD
sixty days to bring its MAS Program into compliance, stating that failure to do so
would result in withholding of ten percent of state funds. (Id.)

5

A curriculum unit is one week of lessons. There are approximately eighteen
weeks in each semester. (ER10 at 2230.) Notably, Sean Arce, director of the
MAS Department, put together the curriculum materials that Cambium reviewed.
(ER4 at 722 – 23.)
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TUSD appealed the Superintendent’s finding. (ER6 at 1085 – 91.) An
independent Administrative Law Judge then conducted a four-day hearing, and on
December 27, 2011, issued a finding denying TUSD’s appeal. (ER6 at 1113 – 49.)
The ALJ’s Order began by noting the issue was not “whether the MAS program
should be suspended, dismantled or terminated, or whether the MAS program has
achieved a certain level of academic success, or whether the MAS program is an
effective program, or whether MAS classes are being taught in accordance with
State Standards.” (Id. at 1113.) Instead, the ALJ identified the sole issue as
“whether to uphold Superintendent John Huppenthal’s June 15, 2011
determination” that the MAS program violates Arizona law by promoting racial
resentment, being designed primarily for one ethnic group, or by advocating ethnic
solidarity instead of treating pupils as individuals. (Id.)
The ALJ then carefully described his review of the evidence, including: the
MAS Program and Pedagogy; the Cambium Report; classroom visits at the
elementary, middle and high school and the materials presented during those
classes; the MAS website and, the testimony of board members, teachers, parents
and experts. (Id. at 1119 – 45.) More specifically, he described the deficiencies
of the Cambium audit caused by, among other things, the MAS director’s failure to
provide requested curricular materials. (Id. at 1120 – 24.) He pointed out that the
MAS website described the MAS program’s purpose as creating “a Latino
15
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identity” and being based on “Latino Critical Race Pedagogy.” (Id. at 1125 – 26.)
His review of MAS pedagogy explained that its founders state that its rationale is
“premised upon the belief that ‘the United States of America was founded and
constructed on racism’ and that ‘[f]rom its inception, America and Americans have
operated on the belief that whites are superior to all other races.’” (Id. at 1127.)
The ALJ dismissed the District’s expert, because he lacked familiarity with the
MAS program, but credited the Department’s expert witness, who testified that that
MAS program materials “were not academically beneficial,” and that the MAS
classes promoted racial resentment, advocated ethnic solidarity over treating
students as individuals and were designed for students of a particular ethnic group.
(Id. at 1130 – 31.) He provided examples of elementary curricula that promoted
divisive political activism in young children and suggested that Latinos had been
“dehumanized.” (Id. at 1132 – 34.) Middle school lessons taught children that
Mexican children had experienced “[f]ive centuries of being at the bottom of the
social, political, and economic rung [that] have devastated our humanity.” (Id. at
1136.) High school classes included “critical race theory” and “critical race
pedagogy” both of which taught students that white Americans want to oppress
others. (Id. at 1139 – 42.) Finally, he concluded with a description of a parent’s
testimony, discussing the pain her daughter experienced in a MAS class where
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students of Mexican and other Hispanic backgrounds would not talk to her because
she was white. (Id. at 1144.)
The ALJ also noted the MAS Program did not use a written curriculum, and
had not sought or received District approval of its curriculum or textbooks. (Id. at
1120.)
In upholding the Superintendent’s decision, the ALJ concluded:
A.R.S. § 15-112 (F) permits the historical (objective)
instruction of oppression that may, as a natural but unintended
consequence, result in racial resentment or ethnic solidarity.
However, teaching oppression objectively is quite different than
actively presenting material in a biased, political, and emotionally
charged manner, which is what occurred in MAS classes. Teaching in
such a manner promotes social and political activism against the white
people, promotes racial resentment, and advocates ethnic solidarity,
instead of treating pupils as individuals.
(Id. at 1147.) The ALJ then stated that the Department was to withhold ten percent
of TUSD’s monthly state aid “until the District comes into compliance with A.R.S.
§ 15-112.” (Id. at 1148.) Superintendent Huppenthal accepted the recommended
decision on January 6, 2012. (Id. at 1150.)
Rather than reform its MAS program to comply with the law, TUSD’s Board
issued an order suspending its MAS classes just four days later. (Id. at 1159.) On
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January 12, TUSD directed teachers to remove several books that had been used in
the MAS classrooms. (Id. at 1165 – 67.)6
Because TUSD’s decision to suspend the MAS classes addressed the
violation of A.R.S. § 15-112, Superintendent Huppenthal notified TUSD that the
Department would not withhold any funds while the Department monitored its
compliance. (Id. at 1161 – 63.) To ensure compliance, the Superintendent asked
that TUSD demonstrate that it had made sure that MAS students were transferred
to appropriate classes; that it had developed a plan for MAS staff to adopt
curriculum in an appropriate manner, while ensuring improved achievement for
Hispanic students; that it had removed MAS instructional materials from the
classrooms; and that it submit a plan to develop a comprehensive social studies
core curriculum. (Id.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court correctly upheld the constitutionality of A.R.S. §§ 15-111
and 112(A)(1), (2) and (4), which prohibit public district and charter schools from
6

Neither the ALJ’s decision nor Huppenthal’s order accepting it required that any
specific books be removed from classrooms. (ER6 at 1289 “[N]othing about my
order . . . requires that those books be banned at all.”) TUSD nonetheless issued a
directive requiring the teachers to remove the following books from their
classrooms: Rodolfo Acuna, Occupied America: A History of Chicanos; Richard
Delgado, Critical Race Theory; Elizabeth Martinez, ed., 500 Years of Chicano
History in Pictures; Rodolfo Corky Gonzales, Message to Aztlan; Arturo Rosales,
Chicano! The History of the Mexican Civil Rights Movement; Paulo Freire,
Pedagogy of the Oppressed; Bill Bigelow, Rethinking Columbus: The Next 500
Years. (ER6 at 1165 – 67.)
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offering courses or classes that inculcate class- and race-based resentment within
school children. Enacting such statutes falls well within the state’s plenary
authority over its curriculum. To the extent that the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment protects a student’s right to receive information, that right is not
implicated by a state statute that limits curricula to pursue a goal of reducing
racism.
The Arce Plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge must also be rejected. The
challenged statute does not contain any classifications, and therefore does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause on its face. And, the district court correctly
concluded that the undisputed facts demonstrate that the Legislature did not act
with discriminatory intent in enacting the statute and that the Superintendent did
not act with discriminatory intent in enforcing it.
And, the Arce Plaintiffs’ due process vagueness challenge fails. The Arce
Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the statute’s vagueness. Because it is not
unconstitutionally vague in all its applications, it does not apply to the Arce
Plaintiffs, and it does not affect their property or liberty interests. Instead, the
statute places curricular limits on public schools. Public school boards have
specialized knowledge in creating and implementing curricular standards that
assists in understanding the statute. The schools also have access to State
resources that can provide guidance and assistance in developing conforming
19
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curricula. And, the schools have procedural protections against arbitrary
enforcement including a right to a hearing and judicial review of the administrative
decision. The Arce Plaintiffs’ arguments improperly shift the high burden of
showing facial unconstitutionality on to the Superintendent, require an unduly high
standard of clarity in analyzing the statute, and fail to recognize that the statute was
not vague in at least one circumstance.
Finally, this Court should reverse the district court’s decision to hold A.R.S.
§ 15-112(A)(3) unconstitutional as overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.
Subsection (A)(3), like its companion provisions, falls well within the authority of
a state over its curriculum, and its proscription against classes “designed primarily
for” one ethnic group is clear.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Superintendent’s Actions Did Not Violate the Arce Plaintiffs’ Free
Speech Rights.
A.

Standard of Review.

This Court reviews a district court's decision on cross-motions for summary
judgment de novo. Blue Lake Rancheria v. United States, 653 F.3d 1112, 1115
(9th Cir. 2011).
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Neither the Superintendent’s Actions Nor A.R.S. § 15-112
Infringed the Arce Plaintiffs’ Right to Receive Information.

The Arce Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred when it failed to
address their argument that Arizona’s “elimination of MAS” classes violated their
First Amendment right to receive information, and that such action constituted
impermissible viewpoint discrimination. (OB at 46 – 48.) Their argument rests on
two flawed premises: First, that Arizona removed curriculum from TUSD; second,
that students have a right to receive any particular curriculum.
1.

The Superintendent did not remove any curricular
materials from the classroom; TUSD did.

The Superintedent did not eliminate TUSD’s MAS curriculum. TUSD, a
nonparty, made that decision. 7 The Superintendent merely conducted an

7

In fact, in their Statement of the Case, the Arce Plaintiffs acknowledge this by
stating, “[a]fter TUSD eliminated MAS.” (OB at 4.) In addition, their record cites
do not support their contention that the Department of Education or the
Superintendent “eliminated the MAS program,” or “prohibited” MAS students
from using specific books. For example, the Arce Plaintiffs cite to ER6 1167 to
support the contention that “MAS students were prohibited from accessing seven
books with Mexican American perspectives after Huppenthal concluded they had
impermissible passages.” (OB at 51.) ER6 1167 is a January 11, 2012, email from
TUSD Deputy Superintendent Maria Menconi, directing that several books
“specifically mentioned in the court order” be “cleared from classrooms, boxed up
and sent to the Textbook Depository.” (ER6 1165 – 67.) At that time, the only
possible “court order” was the ALJ decision that Superintendent Huppenthal had
affirmed, which did not direct any particular action with respect to any books. (Id.
at 1161 – 63.)
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investigation and issued findings, determining that the MAS curriculum violated
A.R.S. § 15-112 because the curriculum promoted resentment, was designed
primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group, and advocated solidarity instead of
treating pupils as individuals. (ER6 at 1092 – 94.) The Superintendent also found
that TUSD had failed to follow both state law and its own district policies
regarding the adoption of curriculum and textbooks. (Id.) Arizona thus gave
TUSD sixty days to “bring the Mexican American Studies Program into
compliance” or face withholding of ten percent of its state funds. (Id.) On appeal,
the ALJ affirmed the Superintendent’s determination, again giving TUSD the
opportunity to come into compliance. (Id. at 1148.)
Instead of bringing the MAS program into compliance with Arizona law,
TUSD’s Board moved, within days, to shut down its program. (ER6 at 1159.)
Because TUSD made the decision to eliminate the MAS program, rather than to
bring it into compliance, this Court need not consider the Arce Plaintiffs’ argument
that the Superintendent violated their First Amendment rights.
Because the Superintendent did not remove materials from the curriculum,
the Arce Plaintiffs’ authority addressing this issue is inapposite. Authority
discussing a school board’s rights to determine curricular content is not relevant
because the question here is the State’s right to set curricular standards for public
schools.
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Because the Constitution places few restrictions on the
States right to establish curricular standards, the district
court erroneously concluded that A.R.S. § 15-112
implicated the Arce Plaintiffs’ right to receive information.

As the district court correctly recognized, A.R.S. § 15-112 does not limit
what students may say in the classroom, and therefore, their First Amendment
claim cannot be sustained on that basis. (ER1 at 10.) The district court also
concluded that students “have an established right to receive information and ideas
in the classroom” and thus applied limited scrutiny in analyzing the Arce
Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. (Id. at 15) The appropriate standard for
addressing state curricular decisions is far more deferential.
The State is obligated to educate its youth. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch.
Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 812 (Ariz. 1994) (stating that, from the
inception of its statehood, Arizona’s public “schools were to be forever under the
exclusive control of the state”) (citing Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat.
557, 570); see also Ariz. Const. art. XI, § 1 (requiring the Legislature to “enact
such laws as shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general and
uniform public school system”). It is the State’s right to establish curricular
standards for its elementary and secondary school students while it is the schools’
obligation to ensure that its policies and procedures are “not inconsistent with law
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or rules prescribed by the state board of education.” 8 See A.R.S. §§ 15-203
(A)(12)-(13) (state board of education’s authority); A.R.S. § 15-341 (A)(1)
(school districts’ obligations).
In finding that A.R.S. 15-112 implicated the Arce Plaintiffs’ right to receive
information, the district court not only failed to account for the State’s plenary
authority over curricular standards as well as a school’s obligation to abide by
them, but also the community’s “legitimate, even [] vital and compelling interest in
‘the choice (of) and adherence to a suitable curriculum for the benefit of our young
citizens.’” Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980)
(citation omitted). The district court failed to defer to what the Supreme Court
termed the “claim of absolute discretion in matters of curriculum” arising from the
“duty to inculcate community values.” Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 861
(1982). It also failed to consider that the Supreme Court cautioned courts
addressing matters of education, because “the education of the Nation’s youth is
primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school
officials, and not of federal judges.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 273 (1988); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)
(“Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation
8

Arizona’s academic standards can be found at http://www.azed.gov/standardspractices/# (last accessed Feb. 21, 2014).
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raises problems requiring care and restraint.”); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (“affirming the comprehensive authority of
the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional
safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools”).
While there are “certain constitutional limits upon the power of the State to
control even the curriculum and classroom,” Pico, 457 U.S. at 861,9 the role of the
First Amendment as a limit on the power of the State in setting curricular standards
is unclear. Pico itself noted that “Petitioners might well defend their claim of
absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate
community values.” Id. at 869. Thus, as the Fifth Circuit explained in Campbell v.
St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 1995),10 the level of First
Amendment scrutiny for a curricular decision is much lower than that for a noncurricular decision. See Griswold v. Driscoll, 625 F. Supp. 2d 49, 54 (D. Mass.
2009) (“the curriculum of public schools is a fully protected form of state speech”),
citing Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995); Seyfried v. Walton, 668
9

See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (noting that State’s power to
prescribe curriculum was not at issue in striking down a statute criminalizing the
teaching of German in schools as a violation of the individual’s due process right);
Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (statute forbidding the teaching of evolution violated
Establishment Clause).

10

Campbell reversed Delcarpio v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 865 F. Supp. 350
(E.D. La. 1994), a case the Arce Plaintiffs rely upon. (OB at 51.)
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F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1981) (a student has no First Amendment right to study a
particular aspect of history because the “selection of course curriculum [is] a
process which courts have traditionally left to the expertise of educators.”)
Thus, while it is true “that there is no strong consensus among the circuit
courts regarding the application of First Amendment principles to the selection of
curricular materials by school boards,” Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 616 (5th
Cir. 2005), it is also clear that where “speech or expression begins to implicate the
school as speaker, First Amendment rights have been limited.” Downs v. L.A.
Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000), (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at
270-73). 11 The Downs court described a school district’s bulletin boards as an “an
expressive vehicle for the school board’s policy of ‘Educating for Diversity,’” and
not a forum for either limited or unlimited discussion. Id. at 1012. Because the
bulletin boards were the government’s own speech, its speech was “not subject to
the constraints of constitutional safeguards and forum analysis, but [was] instead
measured by practical considerations.” Id. at 1013.
Chiras reached a similar conclusion in rejecting a textbook author’s claim
that the Texas State Board of Education had engaged in impermissible viewpoint
11

Notably, Hazelwood imposed its (limited) constraints on the school’s ability to
control student speech in a student newspaper after first concluding that the student
newspaper was a limited public forum for student expression. Hazelwood, 484
U.S. at 263. Here, in contrast, the State’s curricular standards do not create a
forum for student (or teacher) expression.
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discrimination in rejecting his textbook. 432 F.3d at 614. In so doing, the Fifth
Circuit emphasized that when a state board of education devises a curriculum for a
state, “it is the state speaking.” Id. It reasoned that, “the government, including its
educational institutions, has the discretion to promote policies and values of its
own choosing free from forum analysis or the viewpoint-neutrality requirement.” 12
Id. at 613. Under the Downs/Chiras analysis, the Arce Plaintiffs have no claim
that the Superintendent engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimination when it
required TUSD to comply with the challenged statute.
The Chiras court also rejected a student’s claim that her right to receive
information had been violated when the State Board of Education declined to
approve the textbook. 432 F.3d at 620. After noting the possible existence of an
ill-defined right to receive information, based on Pico, the Fifth Circuit granted the
Texas State Board of Education “a wide degree of discretion in performing its
traditional function of selecting curriculum which promotes the state’s chosen
education policy.” Id. It thus rejected the claim that any right on the part of a
12

The Chiras court explained that this principle follows from Rosenberger and
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Rosenberger distinguished between a
university’s ability to control its own message and the requirement that it “not
discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates.”
515 U.S. at 834. Rust upheld the ability of the government to fund programs it
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding other
programs that address the issue differently, because “[a] legislature's decision not
to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.” 500
U.S. at 193.
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public school student to receive information would extend to the right to select
textbooks for a classroom. Id. Similarly here, the Arce Plaintiffs’ right to receive
information does not grant them the right to demand a specific course of study,
curriculum, or textbooks, or to complain when the State institutes enforcement
proceedings to ensure that TUSD complies with state law regarding public school
curricula.
The district court here rejected the Downs analysis, concerned about
“improperly granting the State absolute discretion in devising its curriculum.”
(ER1 at 14.) The district court’s concerns are not well founded. As the Supreme
Court established in Meyer v. Nebraska and Epperson v. Arkansas, there are
constitutional constraints on State’s curricular choices. See note 9 supra. The
district court distinguished the teacher who sought to speak for the government in
Downs from the students here who seek “to vindicate their passive right to be
exposed to information and ideas.” (ER1 at 14.) But the teacher who sought to
present his own message on the school’s bulletin boards in Downs and the students
here who seek to specify the curriculum both want to require the government to
deliver their messages, rather than its own. Therefore, the court’s distinction is
invalid. Relying on that invalid distinction, the district court improperly
scrutinized the State’s effort to control the message it seeks to convey through
statutes that set limits on districts’ curricula under the lens of a First Amendment
28
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right to receive information. Although the district nonetheless correctly upheld
three of the four provisions of A.R.S. § 15-112, it erroneously found one provision
invalid under this incorrect standard.
C.

The Challenged Statute Is Not Overbroad in Violation of the First
Amendment.

The Arce Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s decision that A.R.S. § 15112 (A)(1), (2) and (4) are not impermissibly overbroad in violation of the First
Amendment. 13 (ER1 at 19, 21.) They assert that the use of the words “any
courses or classes” and “includes any” in (A)(2) makes the statute overbroad
because the inclusion of prohibited content in even one class is sufficient to result
in an order invalidating entire courses, even if those courses contained permissible
material. (OB at 52 – 3.) They object to the use of the word “promote” in (A)(2),
which prohibits course or classes that “promote resentment toward a race or class
of people” because it does not refer to intentional conduct. (OB at 54 – 7.) This
court should reject their challenge to phrases “any courses or classes” and
“includes any,” because it was not raised below. See Foti v. City of Menlo Park,
146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the appellate courts do not generally
13

The Arce Plaintiffs have waived their First Amendment overbreadth challenge to
A.R.S. §§ 15-112 (A)(1), relating to classes that promote the overthrow of the
government, and (A)(4), relating to classes that advocate ethnic solidarity over
treatment of pupils as individuals. See Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Litig., 978
F.2d 493, 495, n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the Court will not consider
arguments that are not raised in the opening brief).
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consider issues raised for the first time on appeal). It should reject their challenge
to the use of the word “promote” for the same reasons that the district court did;
when read in the context of the entire statute, it is clear that a “substantial number”
of the applications of the statute are “reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical
interest.” (ER1 at 19.)
In a facial challenge to a law’s validity under the First Amendment, the “law
may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.”
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The first step in overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute; it is
impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing
what the statute covers.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008). In
construing the meaning of “promote” in A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(2) in the context of
the entire statute, it is clear that the statute’s prohibition against courses or classes
that “promote resentment” is reasonably related to the State’s legitimate goal of
reducing racism.
The statute begins with its “Declaration of Policy” which states: “The
legislature finds and declares that public school pupils should be taught to treat and
value each other as individuals and not be taught to resent or hate other races or
classes of people.” A.R.S. § 15-111. And 112(E) and (F) specifically provide that
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the curricula may include courses or classes “that include the history of any ethnic
group [] that are open to all students,” that “include the discussion of controversial
aspects of history,” or that address genocide or the historical oppression of a
people. Also relevant is the title of A.R.S § 15-112, which is “Prohibited courses
and classes,” as well as the fact that its enforcement provisions are solely directed
to schools. A.R.S. § 15-112 (B).
The next step is to examine the meaning of classes that “promote
resentment” using the commonly accepted meaning of “promote.” TDB Tucson
Group, LLC v. City of Tucson, 263 P.3d 669, 672 (Ariz. App. 2011) see also
A.R.S. § 1-213 (“Words and phrases shall be construed according to the common
and approved use of the language.”). The court properly relied on the dictionary
definition, which is “to contribute to the growth, enlargement or prosperity of,” to
“further” and to “encourage.” (ER1 at 17.) E.g., Sierra Tucson, Inc. v. Pima
Cnty., 871 P.2d 762 (Ariz. App. 1994) (using dictionary to help define terms and
noting that in interpreting statute, court gives effect to “statutory terms in
accordance with their commonly accepted meanings”).
Finally, the ALJ’s “sensible construction” of the provision guides inquiry
into its meaning.14 Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131
14

The district court also properly relied on the Superintendent’s assertions that the
statute’s goal is to prohibit classes that promote racism. (ER1 at 16.)
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(1992). The ALJ concluded that the statute permits the “historical (objective)
instruction of oppression that may, as a natural but unintended consequence, result
in racial resentment or ethnic solidarity” while prohibiting the presentation of
material “in a biased, political, and emotionally challenged manner.” (ER6 at
1147.)
In sum, the district court correctly rejected the Arce Plaintiffs’ assertion that
the statute covers “student-driven class discussion that inadvertently brings about
resentment towards a race or class of people,” such as a discussion of Mark
Twain’s Huckleberry Finn or Richard Wright’s Black Boy because such discussion
might promote resentment. (OB at 55.) The court also correctly concluded that
the statute “targets the design and implementation of courses and curricula.” 15
(ER1 at 17.) This is the only construction that makes sense and gives meaning to
the entirety of the statute, which limits a school district’s and charter school’s
inclusion of material in its “program of instruction any courses or classes.” A.R.S.
§ 15-112.

15

Contrary to the Arce Plaintiffs’ assertion (OB at 53-4), one need not rewrite the
statute to conclude that it applies to the design and implementation of courses and
curricula, given the multitude of references throughout the statute to courses and
classes. It is a logical extension of the statute’s plain meaning. Valle del Sol v.
Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006, 1021 (9th Cir. 2013), is inapposite, as it addresses an
opportunity to substitute language in a statute for a “nonsensical” phrase. In any
event, Valle del Sol involved a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause.
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The District Court Erred When It Struck Down A.R.S. § 15112(A)(3), Which Prohibits Courses or Classes Designed
Primarily for Pupils of a Particular Ethnic Group.16

The district court struck down A.R.S. § 15-112 (A)(3), which prohibits
“courses or classes . . . designed primarily for pupils of an particular ethnic group.”
The court found this provision overbroad in violation of the Free Speech Clause
because it did “not promote any legitimate interest that is not already covered by
A.R.S § 15-112 (A)(2) and (A)(4), and also likely would chill the teaching of
legitimate ethnic studies courses,” and concluded that “it does not further any
legitimate pedagogical interest.” (ER1 at 20.) The district court applied the wrong
standard. As explained in Section I(B)(2) above, a State might well claim
“absolute discretion in matters of curriculum by reliance upon their duty to
inculcate community values.” Pico, 457 U.S. at 869. The district court thus erred,
in failing to judge whether the State’s broad discretion in matters of curricular
standards allowed it to limit classes “designed primarily for pupils of a particular
ethnic group.”
When the State’s broad discretion to set curricular standards and its
expressed interest in reducing racism are considered, it is clear that subsection’s
(A)(3)’s prohibition falls well within the State’s authority, and is constitutional.
The statute’s Declaration of Policy, in A.R.S. § 15-111, states that “public school
16

The Superintendent makes his argument on cross-appeal in this section.
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pupils should be taught to treat and value each other as individuals and not be
taught to resent or hate other races or classes of people.” Subsections (A)(1) and
(2) address the stated goal of not promoting resentment or hatred. Subsections
(A)(3) and (A)(4) together accomplish the purpose of teaching pupils to value one
another as individuals. Subsection (A)(3) complements the remaining provisions
of the statute, by ensuring that all courses and classes in all Arizona public schools
are not segregative and are designed for students of all ethnic groups. Considering
the statute in its entirety and with its purpose in mind, subsection (A)(3) falls
within the State’s broad authority over matters of curriculum. This Court should
reverse the district court’s determination that it is overbroad.
E.

Section 15-112(A)(3) Is Severable.

If the Court affirms the district court’s determination that A.R.S. § 15112(A)(3) is unconstitutionally overbroad, it should also affirm the court’s
conclusion that A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(3) is severable. In Arizona, courts will not
declare an entire statute unconstitutional if the constitutional portions of the statute
can be separated from that which is unconstitutional.17 Randolph v. Groscost, 989
P.2d 751, 754 (Ariz. 1999) (severing unconstitutional portions of Proposition 302

17

“[W]hen the constitutionality of a state statute is challenged, principles of state
law guide the severability analysis and [this Court] should strike down only those
provisions which are inseparable from the invalid provisions.” Costco Wholesale
Corp. v. Maleng, 522 F.3d 874, 886 (9th Cir. 2008).
34

Case: 13-15657

03/03/2014

ID: 9000097

DktEntry: 44

Page: 44 of 69

from constitutional portions). On numerous occasions, the State’s courts have held
that “if part of an act is unconstitutional and by eliminating the unconstitutional
portion the balance of the act is workable, only that part which is objectionable will
be eliminated and the balance left intact.” Id. Here, the Court can separate
subsection (A)(3)—pertaining to classes for a particular ethnic group—from the
remainder of the statute.
The Court must first “consider whether that portion of an act remaining after
we sever the invalid portion is independent of the invalid part and enforceable
standing alone.” Id.; see also State v. Pandeli, 161 P.3d 557, 573 (Ariz. 2007)
(same); State v. Coursey, 225 P.2d 713, 719 (Ariz. 1950) (same). Here, the
remaining provisions in A.R.S. § 15-112(A)—prohibiting courses or classes that
promote the overthrow of the government, promote resentment against a race or
class of people, or advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment of people as
individuals—can be enforced independent of subsection (A)(3). As the district
court found, the provisions are not so intertwined that excising (A)(3) affects the
ability to enforce the statute. (ER1 at 20.) Indeed, the Arce Plaintiffs do not
seriously contend otherwise. (OB at 58 – 61.)
Instead, the Arce Plaintiffs rely on the legislative history. (Id. at 58 – 60.)
But a court’s examination of the legislative history should begin from the premise
that a provision is severable unless the parts are “so intimately connected as to
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raise the presumption that the legislature would not have enacted one without the
other.” Millet v. Frohmiller, 188 P.2d 457, 459-60 (Ariz. 1948). In other words,
the question of the legislative intent regarding severability begins with an
examination of the statute’s construction. Here, the statute’s construction clearly
indicates that (A)(3) is severable, because while the provisions complement each
other, they operate independently and do not depend on each other. 18 Even without
subsection (A)(3), the remaining provisions will promote the legislative intent of
the statute as declared in A.R.S. § 15-111, that “public school pupils be taught to
treat and value each other as individuals and not be taught to resent or hate other
races or classes of people.” See State Comp. Fund v. Symington, 848 P.2d 273,
281 (Ariz. 1993) (severing unconstitutional provisions where it was clear that
remaining provisions would promote the overall goal of the act). Under these
circumstances, this Court should affirm the district court’s determination that
subsection (A)(3) is severable.

18

The Arce Plaintiffs urge this Court to rely on statements of individual legislators
to conclude that the statute would not have passed without (A)(3). (OB at 58-60.)
As explained in Section II(C), the statements of individual legislators cannot be
imputed to the entire legislature for the purpose of divining legislative intent.
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Neither the Challenged Statute Nor Its Enforcement Violated the Arce
Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Rights.
A.

Standard of Review.

A district court’s decision to enter summary judgment sua sponte is within
its discretion. Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009).
B.

The Statute Does Not Violate Equal Protection on Its Face.

The Arce Plaintiffs claim on appeal that A.R.S. § 15-112 discriminates on its
face on the basis of ethnicity and race because the statute uses phrases such as
“ethnic group” and “ethnic solidarity.” (OB at 27 – 28.) At the same time, they
have conceded that the statute did not include an express classification. (ER5 at
913.) Thus, the district court correctly noted that the challenged statute does not
create explicit classifications of any kind. (ER1 at 25.) The mere use of the word
“ethnic” does not create a suspect classification based on race or alienage.
C.

The Arce Plaintiffs Failed to Show Discriminatory Intent.

The Arce Plaintiffs next argue that, even if the law is facially neutral, A.R.S.
§ 15-112 should be subject to strict scrutiny because it was enacted and enforced
with discriminatory intent. (OB at 28 – 36.) But, as the district court correctly
found, the Arce Plaintiffs failed to establish the prima facie elements of an asapplied equal protection challenge. (ER1 at 30.)
A law that is neutral on its face may be unconstitutional if it was motivated
by a discriminatory purpose and has a racially discriminatory impact. Vill. of
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Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). In
Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court identified the following non-exhaustive
“subjects of proper inquiry” for discerning discriminatory intent: (1) whether the
historical background of the decision “reveals a series of official actions taken for
invidious purposes”; (2) whether the sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision reveals discriminatory intent; (3) whether there were
departures from the normal procedural sequence; (4) whether the factors usually
considered important by the decisionmaker “strongly favor” a decision contrary to
the one reached; and (5) the legislative or administrative history. Id. at 265 – 68.
The Arlington Heights factors do not reveal the existence of discriminatory intent
in this case for the following three reasons.
First, the Arce Plaintiffs allege that the single enforcement of the challenged
statute shows a gross statistical disparity that establishes the discriminatory nature
of the law. (OB at 30-31.) However, a single instance of enforcement does not
indicate a “clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race.” See Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. As the Superintendent explained in the district court,
many valid reasons motivated the initiation of the investigation and subsequent
enforcement action against the TUSD. (ER8 at 1754 – 55.) First, it is not feasible
to initiate an investigation into every Arizona school’s curricula. (Id.) Second, the
MAS program was the largest of its kind in the State. (Id.) Third, it was the most
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controversial course of study, generating numerous constituent complaints over the
span of several years. (Id.) And fourth, it was the only program that the
Superintendent knew about that offered courses toward fulfillment of graduation
requirements. (Id.) Each of these reasons is a rational justification for the
Superintendent’s action; none indicates discriminatory intent.
Second, the Arce Plaintiffs argue that the legislators’ statements provide
evidence of discriminatory intent that this Court should consider in evaluating their
equal protection challenge. (OB at 26 – 27, 32 – 33). In support of this argument,
they ask this Court to judicial notice of statements made during legislative hearings
on HB2281 and predecessor legislation. (See Request to Take Judicial Notice,
Dkt. 13, Items 5 – 8.)19 Such evidence, however, is not reliable. “[T]he views of a
single legislator, even a bill's sponsor, are not controlling.” Mims v. Arrow Fin.
Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 752 (2012); see also Sempre Ltd. P’ship v. Maricopa
Cnty., 235 P.3d 259, 264, n. 1 (Ariz. App. 2010) (“Additionally, ‘[t]he rule is
clearly established in Arizona that one member of a legislature which passes a law
19

Defendants request that this Court decline to take judicial notice as to Items 5
through 7. Item 8 of the Request to Take Judicial Notice would seem to be
unnecessary, as the district court considered statements made at that legislative
hearing. (ER1 at 27, n. 16.) While it is true that a court “takes judicial notice of
public records not subject to reasonable dispute,” including legislative histories, to
the extent legislative histories “represent the statements of individual legislators,”
the court should consider the weight to give the statements, because such
statements “may be subject to dispute.” Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v.
Goldstene, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1186 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
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is not competent to testify regarding the intent of the legislature in passing that
law.’”) (quoting Golder v. Dep’t of Revenue, 599 P.2d 216, 221 (Ariz. 1979)).20
Furthermore, “[s]tray comments by individual legislators, not otherwise supported
by statutory language or committee reports, cannot be attributed to the full body
that voted on the bill. The opposite inference is far more likely.” In re Kelly, 841
F.2d 908, 912, n. 3 (9th Cir. 1988) (superceded by statute on other grounds).
To the extent that an expression of legislative intent by any one person is
relevant, this Court should consider former Superintendent Horne’s own
description of the impetus for this statute—that “[p]eople are individuals, not
exemplars of racial groups” and that “[i]t is fundamentally wrong to divide
students up according to their racial group” and teach them separately. (ER10 at
2183.) Former Superintendent Horne also stressed that the Department of
Education promulgated standards, performance objectives, and multicultural
curricular standards that encouraged students to learn together. (Id.)
The Arce Plaintiffs also allege that individual legislators invoked racial
stereotypes by using “code” words, which they claim constitutes additional
20

As the Sempre court explained, “[I]t is impossible to determine with certainty
what construction was put upon an act by the members of a legislative body that
passed it by resorting to the speeches of individual members thereof.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Trans–Missouri Freight Ass’n., 166 U.S. 290, 318–19 (1897)).
See also Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative
History, 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 1125, 1139 (1983) (floor debates are “least reliable
kinds of legislative history”).
40

Case: 13-15657

03/03/2014

ID: 9000097

DktEntry: 44

Page: 50 of 69

evidence of discriminatory intent. (OB at 31-33.) They cite Flores v. Pierce, 617
F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1980) for the proposition that the explanations given by
the defendants were simply pretexts to conceal an intent to act upon racial animus.
(Id. at 33.) In fact, supporters of the legislation were clear regarding their concerns
about the MAS program; former Superintendent Horne wrote an “Open Letter”
explaining his disagreement with the MAS teachings in 2007 and unequivocally
stated his concerns about the MAS program in the legislative committee hearings.
(ER1 at 27.) As the district court noted, defendants did not dispute that Arizona’s
legislature enacted § 15-112 in response to complaints about the MAS program.
(Id.) This Court should reject the Arce Plaintiffs’ insistence that legislators used a
“hidden code” to cloak a secret discriminatory intent because the legislative history
shows that legislators openly acknowledged their concerns about the segregated
nature of, and curricular deficiencies in, the MAS program. Furthermore, the court
correctly held that this facet of the legislative history did not reveal discriminatory
intent because a law “passed in response to single manifestation of a perceived
problem does not necessarily show that the motivating instance was unfairly—let
alone unconstitutionally—targeted.” (Id.)
Third, the Arce Plaintiffs assert that former Superintendent Horne’s
departures from normal procedures indicate discriminatory intent. (OB at 34.) In
so doing, they place undue emphasis on the superceded Findings of Violation.
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(ER10 at 2183 – 92.) The district court correctly noted that Superintendent
Huppenthal’s issuance of his own Findings corrected any procedural defects. (ER1
at 27 – 28.)
The Arce Plaintiffs argue that Superintendent Huppenthal showed
discriminatory intent by unreasonably rejecting the Cambium audit, failing to
investigate programs that may violate the statute (despite the lack of constituent
complaints), and relying on a small sample of written curricula and books in his
findings and testimony before the ALJ. (OB at 34 – 36.) The district court
carefully reviewed this evidence, however, and concluded,
Considering the record as a whole, and even drawing all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, Plaintiffs have not shown that
Defendants acted with discriminatory intent. Although some aspects
of the record may be viewed to spark suspicion that the Latino
population has been improperly targeted, on the whole, the evidence
indicates that Defendants targeted the MAS program, not Latino
students, teachers, or community members who supported or
participated in the program.
(ER1 at 29.) For example, the court noted that the deficiencies Superintendent
identified in the Cambium audit—including the lack of information provided to the
auditors by the MAS program and the limited number of classroom observations
(which lasted just under thirty minutes on average)—“provided a reasonable basis
for [his] decision to disregard” that report. (Id.)
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The Arce Plaintiffs do not identify any disputed material facts that create a
triable issue sufficient to withstand summary judgment. The district court
correctly entered summary judgment for the Superintendent. (ER1 at 30.)
D.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Dismissing the
Arce Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claims Sua Sponte.

The Arce Plaintiffs argue that the district court’s decision to grant summary
judgment sua sponte on their equal protection claim deprived them of the
opportunity to come forward with evidence to defeat summary judgment. (OB at
24.) This Court should reject this claim because the Arce Plaintiffs had ample
opportunity to fully and fairly ventilate the issues surrounding their equal
protection claim. (Id. at 24 – 25.)
This Court will affirm a “grant [of] summary judgment without notice if the
losing party has had a ‘full and fair opportunity to ventilate the issues involved in
the motion.’” United States v. Grayson, 879 F.2d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Waterbury v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 820 F.2d 1479, 1480 (9th Cir.1987));
see also Cool Fuel v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming sua
sponte grant of summary judgment where “the parties had every opportunity to
explore and expound the issues . . . and did so to the extent they deemed
advisable”).
The Arce Plaintiffs here, like the party in Grayson, “developed their factual
allegations and legal theories” at great length. The Arce Plaintiffs’ Second Motion
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for Preliminary Injunction devoted some twenty-two pages to the equal protection
argument, addressing every element of an equal protection claim and the evidence
they believed supported that claim. (ER5 at 911 – 933.) They fully addressed their
arguments that A.R.S. §§ 15-111 and -112 were directed at TUSD’s MAS
program, that the law singled out Latino students, that the Department engaged in
selective enforcement, that the law was invalid both facially and as applied, that
strict scrutiny should apply, and that the Department’s actions with respect to the
MAS program established a pattern of discrimination. (Id.) The district court fully
considered each of the Arce Plaintiffs’ arguments, carefully analyzing the law and
addressing the relevant evidence, before rejecting the equal protection claim,
saying that “the Court cannot conclude, on this record, that Defendants’ actions
were motivated by discriminatory intent.” (ER1 at 24 – 29.)
This Court should also reject the Arce Plaintiffs’ contention that they did not
present their equal protection arguments in connection with their request for a
preliminary injunction as fully as they would have if summary judgment were at
issue. (OB at 26.) In fact, the Arce Plaintiffs acknowledged that because they
sought a mandatory injunction, they were required to meet a higher standard of
proof. (ER2 at 246 – 47.) “[M]andatory injunctions ‘are not granted unless
extreme or very serious damage will result and are not issued in doubtful cases or
where the injury complained of is capable of compensation in damages.’” Marlyn
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Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 1980).
The Arce Plaintiffs identify only two pieces of evidence that they would add
to the record if the equal protection claim were remanded: emails from legislators
that purportedly evince animus against Mexican-Americans and evidence of the
relationship between Arizona’s anti-immigration efforts and the passage of the
ethnic studies ban.21 As discussed in Section II(C), above, such evidence has
limited usefulness and would not demonstrate that the Legislature as a whole was
motivated by discriminatory intent in enacting A.R.S. § 15-112.
E.

The Challenged Statute Does Not Burden Minorities’ Access to
Political Process.

The Arce Plaintiffs claim that A.R.S. § 15-112 violates equal protection
because it burdens the ability of Mexican-Americans seeking a curricular change to
remedy past education inequities. 22 (OB at 36-38; citing Washington v. Seattle
Sch. Dist, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982) and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 389-91
21

The Arce Plaintiffs also assert that they were unable to show that the
Superintendent has allowed a predominantly white charter school that uses Paulo
Freire’s methodology to expand, while purportedly “eliminating” MAS in part
because of its reliance on Freire’s works. (OB at 26.) However, the Arce
Plaintiffs did raise and argue this issue in their second motion for a preliminary
injunction. (ER5 at 917, n. 82.)

22

TUSD operates pursuant to a Post-Unitary Status Plan, entered in a long-running
school desegregation lawsuit brought by Mexican-American and AfricanAmerican students in the 1970s. Fisher v. Lohr, No. 4:74-DV-00009-DCB (D.
Ariz. Feb. 29, 2012.)
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(1969)). However, as the district court correctly found, A.R.S. § 15-112 does not
impede Mexican-Americans’ ability to use the political process to remedy racial
discrimination. (ER1 at 26.) It does not “remov[e] the authority to address a racial
problem – and only a racial problem – from the existing decisionmaking body, in
such a way as to burden minority interests,” Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 474; it
simply limits the ability of a public school to offer certain coursework.
This case resembles Valeria v. Davis, 307 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).
There, this Court rejected minority plaintiffs’ argument that Proposition 227, a law
prohibiting California schools from offering bilingual education programs,
“unconstitutionally restructure[d] the political process by placing decision-making
over bilingual education, and only bilingual education, at the state-wide level.” Id.
at 1039. The Court held that the decision to mandate English immersion programs
for all school districts did not place a political obstruction in the way of minorities
seeking to remedy unequal treatment because the “purpose and function of
California’s bilingual education program was, and is, to improve education, not to
remedy racial discrimination.” Id. at 1041.
Similarly, here, a prohibition on courses and classes, in furtherance of the
goal of ensuring that students are taught “to treat and value each other as
individuals and [are] not . . . taught to resent or hate other races or classes of
people,” A.R.S. § 15-111, does not impede minorities’ ability to use the political
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process for the purpose of remedying past discrimination. Instead, it “is simply a
limit on certain coursework that was adopted in connection with efforts to remedy
past discrimination.” (ER1 at 26.) Minority students and parents continue to
participate fully in developing the Post-Unitary Status Plan in Fisher v. Lohr, No.
4:74-DC-00009 DCB.
In spite of the Arce Plaintiffs’ voluminous briefs, evidence, and
contributions to the record, they fail to provide any probative evidence of
purposeful racial discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment. Nor can
they explain what evidence they might discover to support their claim that the State
must have had been motivated by animus against Mexican-Americans when it
established curricular limitations on its schools. Based on all of these factors, the
district court correctly rejected the Arce Plaintiffs’ argument that the statute placed
undue political obstructions on Mexican-American students. (ER1 at 24 – 25.)
III.

The Challenged Statute Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague in Violation of
the Due Process Clause.
A.

Standard of Review.

This Court reviews the district court’s decision on cross-motions for
summary judgment de novo. Blue Lake Rancheria v. United States, 653 F.3d
1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011).
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The Arce Plaintiffs Do Not Have Standing to Challenge the
Statute for Vagueness.

The Court should not consider the claim that A.R.S. § 15-112 is
unconstitutionally vague on its face because the Arce Plaintiffs do not have
standing to bring this challenge. A party has standing to challenge a statute
facially “if no standard of conduct is specified at all” and it “is impermissibly
vague in all of its applications.” Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1347
(9th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted). The district court assumed, but did
not decide whether the Arce Plaintiffs had standing to assert a vagueness
challenge. (ER1 at 22 n. 11.) They do not have standing to assert a vagueness
challenge for three reasons.
First, to show a statute is vague on its face, the Arce Plaintiffs bear the high
burden of proving that every application of the law is unconstitutional and that “no
set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.” United States
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). And the Ninth Circuit has declared that the
Salerno “no set of circumstances” standard applies to facial challenges outside of
the First Amendment and abortion contexts. Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031,
1042 (9th Cir. 2013). The Arce Plaintiffs did not make such a showing here. The
Arce Plaintiffs did not even argue (except in a conclusory caption to their
argument) that the law was unconstitutionally vague in every application and could
never be valid. As the district court correctly acknowledged, the Arce Plaintiffs’
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school district clearly violated the statute; the law is therefore not vague in at least
one circumstance. (ER1 at 23.) The Arce Plaintiffs therefore lack standing to raise
a vagueness challenge.
Second, the statute does not apply to individuals, but to public district and
charter schools. See A.R.S. § 15-112 (A) (“A school district or charter school in
this state shall not include in its program of instruction any courses or classes that
include any of the following” enumerated curricular categories.) Because the
statute, if vague, is only vague as-applied to a public district or charter school in
Arizona, the Arce Plaintiffs cannot therefore argue that the statute is vague “asapplied” to them. United States v. Backlund, 689 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2012)
(“Vagueness challenges to statutes that do not involve First Amendment violations
must be examined as applied to the defendant.”); United States v. Dischner, 974
F.2d 1502, 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Outside of the First Amendment context, a party
has standing to raise a vagueness challenge only if the statute is vague as applied to
his or her specific conduct”) (overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 1997)).
Third, the Arce Plaintiffs cannot meet the threshold requirement to a
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim because they have not identified any
liberty or property interest that is protected by the Constitution and implicated by
the challenged statute. See Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 996
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(9th Cir. 2008) (“A threshold requirement to a substantive or procedural due
process claim is the plaintiff's showing of a liberty or property interest protected by
the Constitution.”). Without some articulated personal liberty or property interest
in the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 15-112, the Arce Plaintiffs only have a
generalized interest in the validity of an Arizona law that applies only to school
districts. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) (stating that
such a “generalized grievance” no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer
standing.)
C.

The Statute Is Not Vague on Its Face or As-Applied to TUSD.

Even if the Arce Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the statute as vague,
their claim must fail. A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it provides a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited or provides
standards that discourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Maldonado v.
Morales, 556 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009). “[D]ue process does not require
impossible standards of clarity.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983).
And, “[c]ondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical
certainty from our language.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110
(1972). Instead, the degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates depends in
part on the nature of the enactment. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S.
489, 498 (1982). “It will always be true that the fertile legal imagination can
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conjure up hypothetical cases in which the meaning of (disputed) terms will be in
nice question.” Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110 n. 15 (internal quotation omitted).
The Arce Plaintiffs allege that the challenged statute is vague because it does
not define key terms and subjects students to the caprices of enforcers. (OB at 40.)
The Arce Plaintiffs have engaged in creative thinking, but it is difficult to imagine
that no public school in Arizona would be able to determine how to conform its
curricula to the law, especially given the availability of administrative guidance
from the Department of Education and the due process rights of administrative
hearings and judicial review by the state courts. Their arguments are based on six
fundamental errors.
First, A.R.S. § 15-112(A) clearly applies only to public district and charter
schools. It does not touch student conduct. As the district court correctly stated,
“numerous facets of § 15-112 indicate that it is directed to school curricula. Thus,
the statute expressly limits what a “school district or charter school” may do, and
what a “program of instruction” may include.” (ER1 at 10.)
Second, the Arce Plaintiffs improperly shift the high burden of showing
facial unconstitutionality to the Superintendent and presume that any lack of clarity
renders the statute unconstitutionally vague. See Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653
F.3d 835, 848 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[S]tatutes will be interpreted to avoid constitutional
difficulties.”). The Arce Plaintiffs assume that the statute’s use of marginally
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unclear terms render an otherwise valid statute void for vagueness by arguing that
the words used in the statute may have multiple potential meanings. (See OB at
40) (alleging that the phrase “resentment toward a race or class of people” has no
objective meaning); see also (OB at 42) (claiming that the phrase “ethnic
solidarity” is vague).
Third, the Arce Plaintiffs rely on cases requiring a higher standard of clarity
to argue that A.R.S. § 15-112 is vague. (OB at 41-42.) They rely on cases
involving laws that result in criminal penalties or infringe a constitutionally
protected right to make their arguments. (Id.) This reliance is fundamentally
flawed because the standard of certainty that due process requires is higher where a
statute imposes criminal penalties or infringes on a constitutionally protected right
such as abortion or free speech. 23 See Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d
531, 555 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, there are no criminal penalties (for plaintiff
students or for the public schools). The Constitution thus permits a lower standard
of clarity. Id. In order to sustain a vagueness challenge to a law that does not
implicate a constitutionally protected right and does not result in a criminal
penalty, the Arce Plaintiffs must prove that the “enactment is vague not in the
sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but
23

While the Arce Plaintiffs do claim a violation of their free speech rights to
receive information, as described in Section I(B)(2), supra, that right is tenuous, at
best, given a State’s plenary authority over curriculum.
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comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of
conduct is specified at all.” Vill. Of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495, n. 7
(quotation omitted). They cannot.
Fourth, the Arce Plaintiffs do not establish that it would be difficult for
public schools in Arizona to understand the meaning of the statute so that they
could determine how to conform their curricula to it. See Recreational Dev. of
Phoenix, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1087 (D. Ariz. 1999), aff'd
238 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that the plaintiffs did not show that an
ordinance was vague on its face because they did not establish that they could not
understand the meaning of the law sufficiently to determine how to conform their
behavior to it). District and charter schools have fair notice of what is prohibited
and have adequate procedural safeguards for clarifying and preventing arbitrary
enforcement. “[I]f the statutory prohibition involves conduct of a select group of
persons having specialized knowledge, and the challenged phraseology is
indigenous to the idiom of that class, the standard is lowered and a court may
uphold a statute which uses words or phrases having a technical or other special
meaning, well enough known to enable those within its reach to correctly apply
them.” United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1289 (9th Cir. 1993).
This statute applies to district and charter schools. Schools have specialized
knowledge in the creation and implementation of curricular standards. See, e.g.,
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Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. Arizona’s Department of Education and Board of
Education have resources available to schools that need assistance in creating
curricula. In this case, after notice, hearing, and an administrative finding that the
MAS program violated § 15-112 (ER6 at 1151-53), the Superintendent and the
Department of Education provided TUSD a letter outlining steps for compliance
and offering State assistance with curricular planning (Id. at 1163). The letter of
assurances acknowledged that curricular planning was a long-term process of
creation, review, revision, and implementation. (Id.) Any school that has
questions regarding curricular or instructional alignment with state standards may
request similar assistance. If schools plan appropriately and consult with the
State’s educational agencies prior to implementing questionable curricula, there is
no danger that they will be taken by surprise by the operation of the law.
Fifth, a public school that violates the law has several layers of protection
against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. If the Superintendent or State
Board finds that a school violated A.R.S. § 15-112, they will notify the school that
it is in violation of the statute. A.R.S. § 15-112 (B). The school then has sixty
days to comply with the statute. Id. If the school does not comply with the statute,
the school has the right to an administrative hearing before funds are withheld from
the school. See A.R.S. §§ 15-112 (C), 41-1092.02. A school aggrieved by the
result of the administrative hearing may seek judicial review of the administrative
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decision. A.R.S. §§ 12-902, -904. This “right to judicial review is inconsistent
with Plaintiffs' claims that the Superintendent's discretion is unfettered.” (ER1 at
23.)
Sixth, the statute was not vague as applied to TUSD. (ER1 at 23.) Facial
invalidation is inappropriate “if the remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole
range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable . . . conduct . . ..”
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974) (citation omitted). As adjudicated by an
independent and objective factfinder who analyzed curricular materials and
considered testimony of multiple witnesses, TUSD violated the statute in a whole
range of identified and proscribable ways. (ER1 at 23.) The district court
concluded that “the ALJ’s Decision was sufficiently detailed to provide notice of
how the MAS program was deemed to violate § 15-112. In short, the lack of detail
in the two sets of Findings does not render the statute vague as applied to the MAS
program.” (Id.) The fact that this statute validly applied to one school district
makes a facial vagueness challenge logically impossible. And it renders the Arce
Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge null.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the decision of the
district court below, finding that A.R.S. § 15-112(A)(1), (2) and (4) are
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constitutional but should reverse the district court’s decision that A.R.S. § 15112(A)(3) was overbroad.

Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of March, 2014.

Thomas C. Horne
Attorney General

s/Leslie Kyman Cooper
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Phoenix, Arizona 85007-2926
(602) 542-8349
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 28-2.6, Defendants/Cross-Appellants state
that they are not aware of any related cases pending in the Ninth Circuit.
s/Leslie Kyman Cooper
Leslie Kyman Cooper
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM
All applicable statutes and constitutional provisions are contained in the
addenda to Appellants’ brief.
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